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SELF DEFENSE FOR WOMEN LAWYERS:
ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
What goes largely unexamined, often even unacknowledged
(yet is institutionalized nonetheless) in our social order, is the
birthright priority whereby males rule females. Through this
system a most ingenious form of "interior colonization" has
been achieved .... The fact is evident at once if one recalls
that the military, industry, technology, universities, science,
political office, and finance-in short, every avenue of power
within the society, including the coercive force of the police,
is entirely within male hands.'
The legal profession, one traditional avenue to wealth, prestige
and power, offers an illustration of the traditionally "closed to
women" attitude of employers in the United States. The present
status of women in the legal profession seems indicative of a
pattern of discrimination which must yet be abated by the 1964
Civil Rights' Act's prohibition against sex discrimination. Two
particular employment patterns can support inferences of sex
discrimination of women in the work force and their income levels
compared to those of men.
Of course, fewer women in prestige occupations and their
lower income levels in general may have been produced by fac-
tors other than sex discrimination in employment. Historically
fewer women than men have applied to medical, law or engineer-
ing schools. Some women have interrupted their careers or lower-
ed their aspirations because of marriage or family responsibilities.
However, it might be asked why fewer women than men attempt
high income careers or why women interrupt careers or lower
expectations. Women could have been discouraged by their
knowledge of their limited employment opportunities in general,
by societal expectations about proper feminine behavior and their
resulting negative incentives to pursue a career, and/or by the lack
of adequate childcare services for working women. Thus the
comparative employment data cannot be dismissed as failing to
support inferences of sex discrimination.
In the professions, women constitute such a small segment as
to be practically negligible-one percent of the engineers, 2 3.7
'K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 25 (1970).
2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1970, at 22" (864,000 male engineers listed, but no female engineers)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
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percent of the lawyers,3  and seven percent of the doc-
tors4 -although women compose approximately one-third of the
work force.5 This dismal picture is further accentuated by com-
parative income figures. In 1965, overall median wages of women
were only sixty percent of the men's median wagesO The low
wages of women in professional, technical, and executive posi-
tions are not substantially different from these figures. 7
The status of women lawyers, in particular, is analogous. Not
only do women constitute a disproportionately small portion of
the profession, they also achieve dramatically less success in
obtaining positions as judges, law firm partners, or professors, and
are paid much less. For example, of a total 333 federal district
court judges, three are women;" of a total ninety-two federal
circuit court judges, one is a woman; 9 of three thousand law firms
ABA rated as "leading," only thirty-two could boast a woman
partner. 10 In 1966, among some 2,335 teaching faculty members
at 134 accredited law schools, only fifty-one women at thirty-eight
of the schools were teaching faculty.11 Income figures for full-time
women lawyers indicate that they start at a lower salary than men
and the discrepancy grows with time.1 2 Moreover, apart from
the humane concern that persons psychologically need, and as a
3 Of the total 214,000 lawyers and judges in the United States, eight thousand are
women, or slightly better than 3.7 percent. Id. 227- 28.
4 Of the 240,000 medical doctors in the United States, sixteen thousand are women, or
6.9 percent. Id.
5 Of the total number of workers of all age groups in the civilian labor force, approx-
imately seventy-five million, women numbered approximately twenty-six million, or
slightly more than thirty-five percent in 1965. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, DEP'T
OF LABOR, SPECIAL LABOR FORCE REPORT No. 69, at A-I (1967).6 of the full time workers in 1965, median wage earnings of men were $6,388 and
median wage earnings of women were $3,828, or approximately 59.8 percent. U.S.
BUREAU OF STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, SPECIAL LABOR FORCE REPORT NO. 82, at A-7
(1967).
7 Id. The statistics for male and female professional, technical, and executive workers
are:
Men Women
Professional $8,459 $5,514 65.2%
Technical 7,895 4,202 53.2%




11 White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1112 (1967).
12 Available income figures for 1964 indicate:
Women Men
Earning more than $20,000 1% 9%
Earning more than $14,000 4. 1% 21%
Earning less than $ 8,000 56.3% 33.6%
Id. 1057. White compared men and women graduates from law school classes of 1956
through 1965. The income differential between men and women after the first year of
practice was $1,500. By the time the class of 1956 was compared, the differential had
increased to $8,400. After examining eight possible explanations for this income
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social reality will try, to realize their individual potentials, 3 it has
been suggested that job discrimination costs the United States
economy billions of dollars annually.
14
Employment and a concomitant opportunity to compete on the
basis of individual merit for the rewards of achievement, whether
they be money, power, prestige, personal satisfaction in a job well
done, or the fulfillment of broad social aims, contribute to the
assertion of legitimate human needs for independence and
self-respect, and contribute to the expression and realization of
individual potential. Women professionals and professional em-
ployers need to understand the applicable law regarding the proof
of sex discrimination, what exceptions there are to prohibited sex
discrimination, the procedures for enforcing that law and the
benefits or detriments to be expected from enforcement proceed-
ings. The purpose of this commentary is to analyze the employ-
ment rights of women, the obligations of their employers under
the law to afford equal employment opportunity, and the impor-
tant stages and available remedies in a fair employment practices
proceeding should litigation become necessary.
I. APPLICABLE LAW
The most significant law dealing with sex discrimination is title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 15 Although the majority of
differential, White concluded that women were discriminated against because of their sex.
Id. 1095. Factors considered and eliminated as not relevant included differences in aca-
demic qualifications, types of employers, differences in type of work performed, and
differences in the amount of work experience.
13 One measure of unrest among women is the recent Harris Poll's conclusion that
American women are experiencing an "underlying mood of ... conflict, frustration, deep
division and change," N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 197 1, at 40, col. I. It likened their "attitudes to
those of black people in 1962, just prior to the emergence of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
and to college students in late 1967, before they rallied behind Senator Eugene
McCarthy." Id. The poll labelled as a real storm signal the fact that a "plurality of
women ... feel 'most men find it necessary for their egos to keep women down.' " Id.
Earlier warnings against the ill effects of continuing widespread discriminatory attitudes
and policies appeared in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
AMERICAN WOMEN, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (M. Mead & F. Kaplan, ed.
1965).
A less sweeping indication of the existence of sex discrimination is the fact that at least
a significant share of poverty in the United States is suffered and endured by families in
which the sole head of the household is a woman. Ten percent of American families are
supported by a sole woman, and the median income for such families was fifty-eight
percent less than the median income among families headed by a man. U.S. BUREAU OF
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW No. 80, at 34 (1967).
1
4 William Brown Ill, Chairman of the EEOC, estimated that job discrimination costs
the United States thirty billion dollars annually, Address by William Brown Ill, to
Organization Resources Counselors, Inc., in New York City, Jan. 21, 22, 27, 1970, in I
CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 5009 (1970). Although the specific sources of the
costs were not indicated, they were presumably a combination of the cost to employers of
utilizing less qualified persons then otherwise would be available, and forgoing higher
quality goods and services to the consumer for the same price.
Is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
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states now have fair employment practices acts banning sex dis-
crimination,' 6 and although title VII requires that the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission 17 (EEOC) initially defer to
state proceedings, practically all cases come before the EEOC
and are litigated under title VII. The deference which the EEOC
must give to state proceedings lasts only for sixty days.' 8 Within
that time the responsible state agency generally has either not
disposed of the matter or not done so to the satisfaction of the
complainant.
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an
employer: 19
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
16 As of January 197 1, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia had enacted Fair
Employment Practices Acts banning sex discrimination in employment.
A series of Presidential Executive Orders has banned sex discrimination in federal
employment, Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 402, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970),
as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 32D (1967) and Exec. Order No.
11,478, 3 C.F.R. 446, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970). However, women lawyers must
rely on administrative procedures established by the Civil Service Commission regarding
government employment and on administrative procedures established by the Secretary of
Labor in regard to government contractors. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, id., superseded
by Exec. Order No. 11,478 id. Also, damage suits by private parties on the basis of
employment discrimination in breach of Executive Orders may not be brought because it
was contemplated that only administrative action by the President's Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity would provide a remedy. Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). Executive Order No. 10,925
and its successors constitute a formulation of policy by the President for the guidance of
federal agencies and do not create a private cause of action, Blaze v. Moon, 315 F. Supp.
495 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Blaze involved a private suit for injunctive relief.
17 The EEOC has authority only to investigate and "to eliminate any ... alleged unlaw-
ful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion,"
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964). The EEOC also may "refer matters to the Attorney
General with recommendations for intervention in a civil action ... or for the institution of
a civil action by the Attorney General ... and to advise, consult, and assist the Attorney
General on such matters." Id. § 2000e-4(f)(6). The EEOC also has the "power to issue,
amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this title,"
Id. § 2000e- 12(a). Courts have held the Guidelines, formulated by the EEOC to aid in the
administration of title VII, to be entitled to great weight in the interpretation of title VII.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Veri Fresh
Poultry, 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969). The Guidelines are to be upheld if they are a
reasonable interpretation of title VII, although they are not regulations with the force or
effect of law. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100
(D.D.C. 1968).
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964). See Cresslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 422
F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970) (appeal pending, 91 S. Ct. 52). The complainant had failed to file
a complaint with the Arizona Civil Rights Commission before filing with the EEOC. The
court held that the complaint should be dismissed. "Federal intervention does not depend
on lack of suitable state relief. Nor is there any requirement for exhaustion of state
remedies. On the contrary time limits for bringing federal suit after the charge has reached
the EEOC are clearly not designed to encourage an aggrieved person to await the outcome
of state proceedings. Federal deference to the states is defined only in terms of time: sixty
days." Id. at 1031.
19 The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
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otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's ... sex ... ; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities ... because of such individuals's...
sex... 20
Title VII provides one exception to its ban on sex dis-
crimination in employment. That exception is commonly called
the "BFOQ:"
2 1
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees ... on the basis
of... sex.., in those certain instances where... sex... is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise ....
II. PROVING SEX DISCRIMINATION
Sex discrimination in the legal profession most often occurs in
two particular situations; in hiring, and in the terms or conditions
of employment. For instance, an employer seeking to hire a grad-
uating law student or experienced lawyer might send to a univer-
sity law school placement office a resume which states: "The firm
is particularly interested in men with initiative and the desire and
ability to assume early responsibility." Future employees are
repeatedly referred to as "men" in the employer's brochure. A
woman applicant whose overall academic record is comparable to
those of the male applicants, and who, apart from her sex, is
indistinguishable from the men to whom the employer offered
jobs, is denied employment.
The other principal form of abuse, that in the terms and condi-
tions of employment, could be exemplified by the case of an
employer's sole female lawyer who has been doing trusts and
estates work for the past ten years. She would prefer to do other
legal work, and over the past ten years she has repeatedly in-
dicated such desire to the employer. She is still an associate and
earning an associate's salary, although most men make partner
between five to seven years after coming in as an associate. Her
20 Id. § 2000e- 2(a).
21 Id. § 20 00e-2(e). Twenty of the states with Fair Employment Practices Acts have
BFOQ or comparable exceptions. Kansas has an interesting BFOQ exception: "Such
occupational qualification shall be determined in the sole discretion of the employer,"
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44- 1103(a) (1970).
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entering qualifications were, and her work has been, on a level
matching that of the men who have been made partners.
A. Discrimination Against The Female Applicant
In the case of the applicant the discrimination consists of the
employer's decision to hire male students no more or possibly less
qualified than the female student and in advertising for applicants
by sex. Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by the specific
language of title VII.
22
Although advertising for applicants by sex may easily be estab-
lished, it may be more difficult to prove that an employer's deci-
sion to hire a male of equal or less qualifications was motivated by
sex discrimination.
The law places the burden of proving the discrimination on the
party alleging the discrimination.23 In some instances, this plaintiff
may be fortunate enough to have evidence of an admission by the
employer that he did not hire or consider the plaintiff because she
was a woman. This type of evidence might be forthcoming from
her own communications with the employer and from the ex-
perience of other applicants, or any persons, who have been
exposed to an employer's discriminatory remarks. Aside from
evidence of discriminatory intent, the female plaintiff would need
evidence of her comparable or superior qualifications in order to
prove that she should have been considered. As a basis for com-
parison, the plaintiff should be able to obtain such evidence from
discovery of the employer's records and criteria upon which he
based his decisions.
24
Clearly, the easiest case of sex discrimination for a rejected
2242 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1964) (prohibits discriminatory hiring practices); id.,
§ 2000e-3(b) (1964): It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to
print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to
employment by such an employer.., indicating any preference, limitation, specification,
or discrimination, based on... sex .. ." This is supplemented by the EEOC Guidelines:
"It is a violation of Title VII for a help-wanted advertisement to indicate preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for the particular job involved." EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4
(1970).
23 United States v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 271 F. Supp. 447, 452 (E.D. Mo.
1966).
242 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1964) provides:
"[E]very employer.., subject to this subchapter shall (1) make and keep
such records relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful practices
have been or are being committed, (2) preserve such records for such peri-
ods, and (3) make such reports therefrom, as the Commission shall prescribe
by regulation or order.. . as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for the
enforcement of this subchapter or the regulations or orders thereunder."
[VOL. 4:3
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female applicant would be the refusal of an employer to hire the
woman despite the fact that her qualifications were superior, as
determined by the employer's own employment criteria, to those
of any successful male applicant(s). In the absence of an admis-
sion of prejudice by the employer, the female applicant will face
two especially difficult problems in proving her case. One
difficulty is reflected in the situation where the rejected applicant
must prove discrimination where she was one of several rejected
and qualified applicants whose credentials are equivalent to the
successful male applicant. The other difficulty will arise where an
employer's decision not to hire was based, in part, upon person-
ality characteristics not easily identified, quantified or objectively
verifiable.
By establishing a factual record of an historical pattern of sex
discrimination, the rejected applicant should be able to offer
probative evidence of unlawful sex discrimination against herself.
This method of proof has been used successfully in cases of racial
discrimination.2 5 However, racial historical pattern cases have
dealt with laboring, and not professional, occupations. The num-
ber of persons available and trained for professional occupations
is smaller; employment criteria are more complicated, more de-
manding, and less easily susceptible to review. Although the prin-
ciples drawn from racial discrimination cases can be rationally
and reasonably applied to cases of sex discrimination in the pro-
fessions, the courts have yet to be requested to articulate any
such analogies. Potential plaintiffs and defendants should, how-
ever, consider the reasonably possible impact of those racial his-
torical pattern cases on the relatively undeveloped law of sex
discrimination.
Statistical evidence of the employer's hiring patterns should
prove useful in developing an historical pattern of sex dis-
crimination. The plaintiff could seek such evidence through dis-
covery of the employer's records and any other possible sources
of information about applicants. The use of statistical evidence to
prove a pattern of discrimination has been approved by the feder-
2 See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), where an
individual sought relief on behalf of himself and blacks as a class. Plaintiff established a
class violation of title VI I by using defendant company's employment statistics. The court
said that the company's discrimination in employment against blacks furnished a strong
inference that Parham himself was rejected on racial considerations, but that such a
presumption was not conclusive because of his previous employer's poor recommendation.
See also Engineers Local 12 v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, I CCH EMPLOY-
MENT PRACTICES GUIDE V 9420 (Cal. App. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970)
(employment statistics successfully used to establish inference of discrimination).
SPRING 197 11
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al courts 26 and has been used by the EEOC to find probable cause
to believe that there has been sex discrimination.27
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel,28 a federal district court
held that evidence of statistical probabilities indicating a likeli-
hood of job bias was admissible to infer the existence of a practice
or pattern of racial bias and in some instances, might raise such a
compelling inference as to make out a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. In that case black employees were concentrated in
eleven out of eighty-two departments of defendant's plant and in
the hottest, dirtiest and least desirable jobs. Some 83.6 percent of
black employees were so situated. In Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co.,29 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that as a matter of law the defendant's employment statistics
established a class violation of title VII. The extraordinarily small
number of blacks employed, for the most part, as menial laborers,
established a general practice of racial discrimination. Judicial
notice was taken of the fact that 21.9 percent of the Arkansas
population was black. The court found that such evidence of
generalized discrimination established a strong inference that the
plaintiff, Parham, was rejected on racial grounds. The presump-
tion was not held to be conclusive only because the defendant had
a valid independent reason for not hiring Parham in particular,
i.e., a previous employer gave an unfavorable evaluation of Par-
ham.30 Parham could not be applied to women lawyers on the
basis of statistics comparing the female population in the relevant
geographical area with the number of previously successful female
lawyer applicants. Presumably a large portion of the population
would not be available for employment as attorneys because only
a small portion could display the necessary training, qualifications
2
rSee Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Alabama v.
United States, 304 F.2d 583, 587 (5th Cir.), aF'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel, 312 F. Supp. 977, 992 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).2 7
See EEOC Dec. No. 70- 145, 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6066 (Sept.
9, 1969), where a woman applied for the position of management trainee. The median age
of male assistant managers was 22.3 years and of female assistant managers was 42.4
years. The Commission decided that this "pattern indicates young females are system-
atically excluded from the work force while young males are readily hired;" EEOC Dec.
No. 71-345, I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6167 (Oct. 13, 1970), where an
employer maintained an illegal policy of hiring no black females for production jobs. No
black women had ever been hired for other than clean-up work. Blacks constituted forty
percent of the population in the metropolitan area. The Commission decided that the
evidence supported a finding of discrimination.
28312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
29433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
30 In Engineers Local 12 v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, I CCH EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES GUIDE 9420 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970), in which there were
no questions about the individual qualifications of the complainant, the court found
substantial evidence to uphold a finding of racial discrimination, the evidence being a
union's membership and employment statistics.
[VOL. 4:3
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and potential to succeed in the practice of law, while a sig-
nificantly larger part of the population might be presumed to
display traits indicating competence as sales personnel, office and
clerical workers, skilled craftsmen and stockmen. However, wom-
en could reasonably use the Parham case to establish sex dis-
crimination by evidence indicating a disparity between the ratio of
men to women lawyers either living in the relevant area or looking
for jobs in the relevant area, and the ratio of successful men to
women applicants over a period of time.Al
Another type of evidence that could be probative of an histori-
cal pattern of sex discrimination against professional women
would be evidence that an employer historically classified certain
jobs as "male" or "female." For example, the employer had failed
to hire, or hired in disproportionately small numbers, female appli-
cants possessing the basic skills and training to be lawyers and
instead historically hired disproportionately large numbers of
women as secretaries or bookkeepers.3 2 An example of such
disproportionality would be an employer's hiring of ninety percent
male and ten percent female attoraiey applicants and the same
employer's hiring of ten percent male and ninety percent female
qualified secretary or bookkeeper applicants. Whether the courts
will find a prima facie case of sex discrimination on the basis of
such statistical evidence remains to be seen. The analogies, how-
ever, reasonably can and should be made.
One manner of supplementing historical evidence, or perhaps
establishing independent evidence, would be to have several
women apply to the same employer and use the record of the
employer's reaction to these applications to support an inference
of discrimination.33 The employer's own records of job appli-
31 See Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968),
where in a pattern and practice suit the failure of any black applicants to be admitted to an
electrical craft union by itself did not show a pattern or practice, but the court did say that
to make a case for class purposes, it would be enough to show that applicants possessed
basic skill in the particular trade involved; EEOC v. Plumbers Local 189, 311 F. Supp.
468 (S.D. Ohio 1970), where there were nine blacks in the city possessing city plumbing
licenses. The Union required that all persons obtain one before admission to its member-
ship. Defendant's board member stated that anyone passing the city's license exam could
pass the local's journeyman exam. The court compared the lack of black employees with
the diverse population of the area and defendant's regular hiring and standard job require-
ments and found a reasonable inference of discrimination.
32 See Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969), where an
employer defendant who knowingly and voluntarily classified blacks to job positions not
affording opportunity for advancement was held to have engaged in discriminatory employ-
ment practices. The court held that the defendants' failure to show that the discrepancies
in job classification resulted from identifiable differences based on ability, intelligence or
aptitude of blacks as opposed to whites necessitated a holding of unlawful employment
practices. Defendant hired blacks only for unskilled labor and whites for skilled labor
leading to advancement.
33 One strike suit has already been permitted under title VII. See Lea v. Cone Mills
SPRING 197 11
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cations and job decisions might similarly provide relevant in-
formation. Evidence of this nature would be particularly useful in
an effort to establish a simple "failure to hire" women constituting
discriminatory practice where qualified women are available but
where there have been no prior female applicants. This type of
evidence has been found persuasive in establishing a "failure to
hire" in cases of racial discrimination.
3 4
Whether a woman establishes an inference of sex dis-
crimination by showing expressed prejudicial attitudes or histori-
cally discriminatory employment patterns, she will encounter the
additional problem of carrying the burden of proving dis-
crimination in the face of the employer's response that his deci-
sion not to hire was based, in part, upon personality character-
istics not easily identified or quantified. Although the employer
may not rely on the assumption than an individual lacks these
personality characteristics simply because she is a woman,3 5 he
Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969), where the court granted an injunction prospec-
tively ordering that all discriminatory practices against black women by the defend-
ant-employer end. The court recognized that the primary motive of the plaintiffs in
applying for employment with the defendant was to test its employment practices, but
granted the injunction nonetheless.
34 A lack of applicants is not an excuse, Lea v. Cone Mills Corp. 301 F. Supp. 97
(M.D.N.C. 1969); EEOC v. Plumbers Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970)
(alleged lack of interest by blacks in joining the Union was not due to a lack of skilled
blacks in the area, but rather to the reputation defendant had in the black community that
only whites were welcome.)
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to "fail or refuse to
hire" because of any of the proscribed bases of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2(a)(1)
(1964). In a speech by EEOC Chairman William H. Brown, III, Jan. 29, 1970, it was
pointed out that the "refuse" part of the statutory language is self-explanatory, but that the
significance of the "fail" language had escaped many employers.
"It will not suffice to say, 'I've been sitting here just waiting to grab a few of
those people, but none ever show up at my personnel office.' You must make
it your business to see that minority applicants do show up, through
affirmative recruitment, and are hired. This means not simply making prom-
ises, but attaining positive results. If such results are not forthcoming, as I
hope they soon will be, then self-initiated government activity may be neces-
sary to make sure that the same opportunities are available to minority
groups as to the rest of the population. ."
I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE t 5011 (1970).
S"The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: The refusal
to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.
Such stereotypes include ... that women are less capable of aggressive sales-
manship.... The principle of non-discrimination requires that individuals be
considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any
characteristics generally attributed to the group."
29 C.F.R. § 1604.l(a)(l)(ii) (1969). See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); both
cases involved weight-lifting limitations, which the courts held were not allowable as a
means of preventing women from being considered for a job. The courts said that each
woman should be judged on the basis of individual ability. See also EEOC Case No. AL
68-3-243E, I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6015 (June 4, 1969), where an
[VOL. 4:3
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can assert that plaintiff's interview indicated she lacked such
qualities as the ability to communicate or to get along with diverse
kinds of persons, initiative, reasonableness, judgment, aggressive-
ness, tact, or persistence in a task. If an employer's claim of
deficiency in personality requirements for the job were accepted
by the court, an employer could be found to have discriminated
historically, yet be innocent in the individual case, as in Parham.
Although employers should be able to make employment deci-
sions with due regard to personality factors of applicants, employ-
ers should not at the same time be permitted to use such consid-
erations as a shield against legitimate charges of sex dis-
crimination. If impressions gained through the interviewing pro-
cess were given unimpeachable status as a justification for hiring
decisions, one might anticipate some unwarranted use of this
defense. Although no court decisions have dealt with personal
interviews in professional or executive employment, several court
decisions and EEOC policy might be useful in suggesting a judi-
cial solution to this problem.
In Colbert v. H-K Corporation,3 6 a Georgia district court con-
cluded that personality tests, as a matter of law, come within the
ambit of title VII's requirement that aptitude tests not "be design-
ed, intended or used to discriminate. ' 37 The job involved was that
of a general secretary, clerk-typist. Moreover, the EEOC Guide-
lines specify that an employer's estimation of an applicant's per-
sonality, based on a personal interview, is a personality test,38 and
employer gave an editorial writer clerical work and refused to give such work to the male
editorial writers, then downgraded the female editorial writer in pay and position, although
she was better qualified than other male editorial writers. The Commission decided that
the employer must judge employees on the basis of individual merit, not upon stereotyped
conceptions of "female jobs."
3 63 CCH LAB. CAS. 9514 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
37 "[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act
upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of... sex .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
38 "The term 'test' includes... scored interviews ... interviewers' rating scales, scored
application forms, etc." EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1970).
"Selection techniques other than tests, as defined in § 1607.2 miy be
improperly used so as to have the effect of discriminating against minority
groups. Such techniques include ... unscored or casual interviews and un-
scored application forms. Where there are data suggesting employment dis-
crimination, the person may be called upon to present evidence of validity
being of the same types referred to in §§ 1607.4 and 1607.5. Data suggesting
the possibility of discrimination exist, for example, when there are differential
rates of applicant rejection from various minority and nonminority or sex
groups for the same job or groups of jobs or ... disproportionate representa-
tions of minority and nonminority or sex groups among present employees in
different types of jobs. If the person is unable or unwilling to perform such
validation studies, he has the option of adjusting employment procedures so
as to eliminate the conditions suggestive of employment discrimination," id.
§ 1607.13.
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personality tests, like other ability tests, are required under title
VII to be professionally developed, 39 fairly and uniformly admin-
istered, 40 and reasonably related to the requirements of the job.41
Since it may be relatively impossible to meet such requirements
regarding the personal interview, some refinements of these stan-
dards must and most likely will be made. Even if employers were
willing to use a professionally developed psychological test, such
a test may quite possibly fail to be any more reliable than a
personal interview in making necessarily subtle and complex eval-
uations of so indiscernable a quality as personality.
The EEOC Guidelines suggest than an employer's subjective
personal interview which is incapable of verification for objectiv-
ity should not be allowed to be used as an excuse not to hire
women. 42 Although this would prevent unjustified reliance on the
personal interview as a basis for not hiring women, it would not
protect the employer's need to retain the power to make employ-
ment decisions, in part, upon personality evaluations. Should the
courts not be prepared to place such stringent restrictions on the
personal interview, they should decide, on a case by case basis,
whether to believe the employer's contention that personality
factors were the deciding employment criteria, or to believe the
plaintiff's assertion that sex discrimination was the reason for a
refusal to hire. Against the employer's contentions of impressions
gained during the interview and evidence of any conversation or
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(h) (1964).
40 Id.
41 "Evidence of a test's validity should consist of empirical data demonstrating that the
test is predictive or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior
which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being eval-
uated." EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1970). See EEOC Dec. No.
68-9-327E, I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6016 (June 18, 1969), where the
Commission decided that use of a test which tends to exclude blacks and other minorities
to a greater extent than whites is proscribed by title VII unless the test is professionally
developed, i.e., it is shown that the test is related and has been validated as a predictor of
job performance, and only a test which has been validated for minorities could be assumed
to be free of inadvertent bias.
The courts have generally held that the tests must be job related, Hicks v. Crown
Zellerback Corp., I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 8037 (E.D. La. 1970) (tests
which operate to prefer whites to blacks without business necessity are unlawfully dis-
criminatory, although professionally developed); Colbert v. H-K Corp., 63 CCH LAB.
CAS. 9514 (N.D. Ga. 1970). (As a matter of law personality tests come within the ambit
of title Vil's requirement that aptitude tests not be "designed, intended, or used to
discriminate." Professionally developed tests reasonably related to the requirements of the
job would not be struck down as discriminatory if uniformly and fairly administered.); cf.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 39 U.S.L.W. 4317 (Mar. 9, 1971), where the Supreme Court
held that any test must be related to the skills necessary to the job for which the
application is made. The Court said that the intent of Congress was to make job quali-
fications controlling in employment and promotions. Congress was concerned with the
consequences of the employer's employment practices and not his subjective intent.
42 EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.13 (1970).
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knowledge of the plaintiff gained outside the interview, should be
weighed the plaintiff's evidence of a pattern of sex discrimination
in the employer's firm, evidence of discriminatory policies or
attitudes displayed during the interview, and any other evidence
of the defendant's discriminatory practices.
The employer's statistical record of employment policy should
certainly enter into the factual determination. The EEOC Guide-
lines suggest that the stronger the statistical evidence showing
discrimination in hiring, the less weight should be given to an
employer's unsubstantiated allegations regarding an applicant's
personality. 43 A judicial balancing of all the relevant circum-
stances on a case by case basis should discourage employers from
using the personal interview in employment decisions as a loop-
hole to title VII, and yet protect the legitimate need of employers
to rely on personal interviews.
B. Discrimination Against the Female Employee
In the case of discrimination against female professional em-
ployees in type of assignment, advancement and pay, there are
virtually no helpful court cases,44 and no EEOC decisions in-
terpreting title VII. Reported title VII cases all deal with nonpro-
fessional employees where the hiring, promotion, compensation
and type of work assigned to employees may involve less com-
plicated analyses of qualifications and performance. Because of
the more complicated nature of a professional job and because of
a lack of objectively verifiable standards of adequate performance,
a more sophisticated approach to determining the presence of
discrimination is needed than is found in cases dealing with pro-
duction, clerical or semi-skilled workers. Discrimination is a fac-
tual issue to be tried by the court on a case by case basis45 and
what follows suggests possible methods of proving sex dis-
crimination against women attorneys in violation of title VII.
In addition to comparing her treatment on the job to that of
men performing similar jobs or to men of similar qualifications,
the woman lawyer suffering discrimination in the type of work
assignment, advancement, or pay may use methods of proof
somewhat similar to those of a rejected female applicant.
43 Id.
4E.g., EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1967) (dismissed on procedural
grounds, a woman attorney's suit for sex discrimination).
4United States ex rel. Clark v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
The injunctive relief available under title VII is equitable in nature and does not warrant a
jury trial; Brown v. Southern Dyestuff Co., I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE
8045 (W.D.N.C. 1970); Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970); even if the
defendant acquiesces to the plaintiffs request, Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co., I CCH
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 9486 (D.C. Conn. 1970).
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Discrimination against women attorneys with respect to com-
pensation for substantially similar jobs46 can be established by
comparative evidence. If wage differentials do exist, the employer
has the burden of proving himself to be within the exceptions to
title VII's requirement of nondiscrimination in compensation.
47
These exceptions are a bona fide seniority or merit system, quan-
tity or quality of production, and the exceptions provided for by
the Equal Pay Act,48 which allows a differential in pay when there
is a bona fide seniority, merit or incentive system, or when the
differential is based on any factor other than sex. 49 Such
well-structured systems generally do not exist in the partnership
practice of law.
Proof of discrimination against women employees with respect
to work assignment and responsibility can similarly be established
by comparative evidence of the employer's treatment of men and
women employees. The practicing woman lawyer might be denied
an employment opportunity because of an employer's subjective
evaluation of personality characteristics required for certain re-
sponsibilities. Since an employer may rely on such factors, but
cannot use different standards for men and women, he will neces-
sarily have in his possession any evidence demonstrating justifica-
tion for his allegations and reliance on personality factors. The
woman attorney should seek discovery of such evidence from the
employer.
If an employer does not consider a woman lawyer for particular
responsibilities or for areas of practice because the employer
assumed women have characteristics undesirable for particular
tasks or responsibilities, he has clearly violated title VII. 50 In the
absence of evidence relating to personality characteristics, a wom-
4 The standard for comparing the complainant's job to another job requires that the two
jobs be "essentially similar," not identical, United States ex rel. Clark v. H.K. Porter Co.,
296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (interpreting title VII).
47 A pla1ntiff has -the burden of establishing discrimination. An employer has the burden
to prove whether he comes within the BFOQ exception to discrimination. Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). In view of the general
canon of statutory construction that a person claiming an exception has the burden of
proof, it is only reasonable that the employer should have the burden in this instance,
because only he will have evidence tending to establish that although the jobs may be
similar, the pay differential is justified by exceptions recognized by the law.
In addition, since title VII incorporates the exceptions which the Equal Pay Act allows
to unequal pay for the same jobs, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964); and since the Equal Pay
Act has been interpreted to require an employer to prove himself to be within the
exceptions, Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970), title VII should not be interpreted to give employers otherwise outside the
coverage of the Equal Pay Act an advantage over employers covered by both title VII and
the Equal Pay Act.
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000a- 2(h) (1964).
49 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
5 ) See note 35 supra.
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an lawyer might use statistical evidence to establish an historical
pattern of the employer's failure or refusal to consider women for
certain types of work or responsibilities 5I and the employer's
contrary patern with respect to men. This would be similar to the
kind of statistical evidence that an applicant would want to com-
pile.
It is especially important that women employees not be pre-
vented through sex discrimination from exercising responsibility
in a desired general area of the law. For example, if the litigation
experience of women is limited to filing motions, or if women are
permitted to have less client contact than men, women may re-
ceive less compensation because their responsibilities require less
skill and because of a reduced ability to bring in new business.
The point is not that a woman attorney should be able to do any
kind of legal work imaginable, but that she be entitled to seek
work experience and responsibility on the same terms accorded
her fellow lawyers.
A practicing woman attorney may be discriminated against
because of her sex in promotions and denied the opportunity to
advance to higher levels of responsibility and pay, e.g.,from senior
associate to junior partner, senior partner, et cetera. Law firms
usually are partnerships subject to title VII. They are businesses
in interstate commerce for profit; they are not private clubs which
may accord their members the unfettered right to restrict member-
ship to persons acceptable to the present membership. One might
quibble as to whether becoming a partner is one of the "terms,
conditions or privileges" of employment, 52 but it is difficult to
conceive that attaining the status of partnership is not a privilege
of employment when all associates continually strive to reach
partnership, and job security is not attained until partnership is
achieved. Admittedly, personality characteristics necessary for
the successful management of the business do enter into a deci-
sion to make an offer of partnership. However, when charges of
sex discrimination in promotions are brought, personality require-
ments of the job can and should be dealt with just as they are in
hiring situations or Work assignments.
51 This situation is analogous to the situation in which a woman attorney would use
statistical evidence to establish a refusal or failure to hire; here the complaint would be a
failure or refusal to accord conditions, terms, and privileges of employment nondiscrimina-
torily. See notes 25-31 supra.
5242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). See note 21 supra and accompanying text. White
brings up this possible objection to considering partnership status as a term, condition, or
privilege of employment. White, supra note, I I at 1106-07. White concluded that partner-
ship is one of the "privileges" and that a firm would have difficulty buttressing its
objections to women partners on constitutional grounds. Id. at 1107 n. 93.
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III. BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
In addition to asserting that an applicant or employee fails to
meet personality requirements or that an employee does lower
quality work on the job, an employer defending against a dis-
crimination suit might maintain that the complainant was not hired
or promoted pursuant to title VII's exception for a "bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary for the normal
operation of the business." 53 Possibly standing in the way of equal
employment opportunity for women 54 are several frequently re-
lied upon cultural assumptions which employers might claim to be
BFOQ's in sex discrimination suits. Examples of such assump-
tions which law firm employers might claim to be BFOQ's are: (1)
clients prefer to deal with male lawyers and only men are capable
of winning client acceptance and approval; to hire women would
cause the employer to lose these clients; (2) women are not
psychologically suited for certain types of legal work (for ex-
ample, labor law and litigation because of the pressures involved
in negotiations and trial, or corporate practice because women are
not adept at business) and are more adept at family law or trusts
and estates; (3) women have a higher turnover rate, exhibit more
absenteeism, and are less reliable than men because of marriage,
pregnancy, and family responsibilities. An employer cannot rely
on these assumptions as grounds for not hiring or promoting
women unless he can persuade a court that they are BFOQ's and
that hisl discriminatory actions are based upon valid reasons
directly related to the requirements of the job.
The current judicial test for the BFOQ exception was an-
nounced in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,55
where the woman plaintiff sought a switchman's job which occa-
sionally involved lifting weights heavier than thirty pounds and
late night calls. The court articulated the test in the following
terms:
[A]n employer has the burden of proving that he had reason-
able cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that
all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involvedP
6
The Weeks court based its narrow interpretation of the BFOQ
1142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).54The discussion here is meant to apply to other professional, administrative and
executive positions, as well as legal ones.
5 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
56 Id. at 235.
[VOL. 4:3
Self Defense for Women Lawyers
exception upon EEOC Guidelines, 57 and upon the recognition
that, "construed broadly, the [BFOQ] exception will swallow the
rule" 58 of nondiscrimination and would be, therefore, inconsistent
with the purpose of title VII. The Weeks court discussed the
inadequacies of the lower court's decision in Bowe v. Col-
gate-Palmolive Co.5 9 which broadly construed a BFOQ exception
for "basic differences in the physical characteristics, abili-
ties ... and limitations of the respective sexes." '60 Bowe was re-
versed on appeal, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Colgate would be required to afford all workers the opportun-
ity to demonstrate their ability to perform strenuous jobs on a
regular basis if it was to retain its thirty-five pound weight-lifting
limit. The Weeks court concluded by saying that "[wihat does
seem clear is that using these class stereotypes denies desirable
positions to a great many women perfectly capable of performing
the duties involved."
6' 1
The weight-lifting cases are relevant to title VII cases involving
professional women because the cases establish a judicial re-
quirement of non-stereotyping of women. 62 Thus, employers may
not lawfully discriminate against women lawyers on the basis of
assumptions and stereotypes about their aggressiveness, unique
psychological predilections for certain areas of work, or ability to
cope with the pressures in certain fields. 63
Objections to hiring women on the grounds of client preference
fail to meet the Weeks test and have been specifically disqualified
57 EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1970). "The Commission believes that the
bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrow-
ly .... The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the appli-
cation of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: (i) The refusal to hire a woman
because of her sex, based on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics
of women in general .... (ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes .... The principle of non-discrimination requires that in-
dividuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any
characteristics generally attributed to the group."
58 408 F.2d at 235.
59416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
60 272 F. Supp. 332, 365 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
61 408 F.2d at 236.
62 Even the district court in Bowe recognized this principle in regard to characteristics
other than the physiological, where it is said that "traditional roles and stereotyped
characteristics of taste or talent or emotions" could not operate to permit generic classifi-
cation. 272 F. Supp. at 365.
63408 F.2d at 236. "Title VII rejects ... romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and
instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take on
unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the incremental
increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks
is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be on an equal
footing."
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as a BFOQ by the EEOC.6 4 Nevertheless, in one federal district
court case, Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,6 5 the court
found, on the basis of legislative history, a client preference for
female airline stewardesses to be a permissible BFOQ. An in-
terpretative memorandum proposed by Senators Clark and Case
for title VII and the BFOQ was cited by the court in explaining
its decision that:
[Customer preference can be a basis for an employer's se-
lecting employees on the basis of their sex where the prefer-
ence is a legitimate one, related to the difference in the way in
which the work will be performed by persons of different
sexes, and in the manner in which such performance will be
received by the customer because of such differences. (Em-
phasis added). 66
On the basis of this language, the court upheld the employer's
claim that "extensive experience" indicated that women, unlike
men, exhibit-the interpersonal abilities necessary to promote the
clients' psychological sense of well-being when in the unique
environment of an airplane in flight. Defendant admitted that it
could not test for these abilities, but submitted as evidence that
women were more "qualified," a psychologist's opinion testimony
that "the aggregate of separate personal characteristics...
constitutes what we commonly describe as 'femininity'; that...
'it would be quite infrequent to find a man possessing each
of these traits to at least as high a degree as the average
woman.' '7 The employer also relied on a professionally con-
ducted opinion survey which indicated that clients preferred wom-
en flight attendants, but not why clients had such a preference.
Thus the Diaz court used traditional characterizations of the
sexes to permit the employer's successful assertion of client pref-
erence as a BFOQ, despite EEOC strictures and court decisions
to the contrary.
68
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed.6 9 That court adopted the EEOC Guidelines,
64 EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1064.I(a)(1)(iii) (1970). See EEOC Dec. No. 70-I1,
I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICEs GUIDE 6025 (July 8, 1969), where the commission
decided that a bank's objections to hiring female courier guards on the basis of client
preference was an unlawful employment practice: "this argument, is, in law, without merit,
since it presumes that customers' desires may be accomodated even at the price of
rendering nugatory the will of Congress."
6 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
66 id. at 569.
67 Id. at 567.
68 See note 35 supra.
69 Diaz v. Pan American, 39 U.S.L.W. 2580 (Apr. 20, 197 I).
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noting that the BFOQ as to sex should be narrowly construed.
Because the nonmechanical aspects of a flight cabin attendant's
job are not reasonably necessary to the carrier's essential business
of transportation, the court held it could not exclude all males
because some males may not perform adequately. An employer
who would practice sex discrimination must show (1) the imprac-
ticability of finding men who possess abilities most women pos-
sess and (2) that such abilities are necessary, not merely tan-
gential, to the business.
Assumptions about the suitability of women for particular areas
of legal practices cannot justify employers' refusals to hire women
lawyers or attempts to limit advancement or the type of legal
work done. The basis for the Weeks formulation of the BFOQ
exception rests on the requirement that women be judged as
individuals, rather than as members of a class whose character-
istics may be assumed to be different from those of men.
Applying the Weeks test and EEOC Guidelines 70 to assump-
tions concerning turnover rates and absenteeism among women
lawyers would seem to indicate that sex may not be a BFOQ. An
employer would have a difficult time proving that all or substan-
tially all women lawyers are unable efficiently to perform their
duties because of higher turnover and absentee rates among wom-
en than among men. In light of current studies, it seems that there
is no conclusive evidence regarding differences between male and
female turnover in the legal profession, although there is no sig-
nificant difference between male and female absenteeism in gener-
al. 71 One study indicated that the job turnover rates of men and
women differ to a greater degree the longer the men and women
are out of law school. After three years, thirty percent of the men
were at the first job and twenty-nine percent of the women were
at the first job; after seven years, 14.5 percent of the men were at
70 The Guidelines specifically provide that the assumption that the turnover rate among
women is higher than among men does not warrant the application of the BFOQ ex-
ception. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a)(I)(i) (1970).
71 The average number of workless days per person does not differ markedly between
men and women, the differences oscillating around a very narrow range from year to year:
Men Women




Figures for the years 1962-63 were obtained from U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HEW
MEDICAL CARE HEALTH STATUS, AND FAMILY INCOME 71 (1964). A work disability day
is a day of work missed because of illness or injury, and would include pregnancy and
childbirth. The other figures were obtained from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1965, at 80; 1966, at
81: and 1967, at 83.
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their first job and 11. 1 percent of the women were at their first
job.72 That study concluded that if men and women were com-
pared from seven different graduating classes and over a nine year
period, a significant statistical difference existed. 73 However, an-
other study concluded that thirty-four percent of the men and only
twenty-four percent of the women lawyers sampled had changed
employers three or more times.
7 4
The assumption that marriage makes women unreliable em-
ployees has been rejected as a BFOQ by EEOC Guidelines,
75
EEOC decisions, 76 and one court. In Sprogis v. United Air
Lines,77 an Illinois district court held that United's policy of firing
stewardesses who married and not firing male employees and
other flight attendants who married was a violation of title VII.
Likewise, pregnancy, actual or possible, as justification for sex
discrimination has been rejected by one federal court and the
EEOC, at least where a leave of absence is practicable. 78 In
72 White, supra note 12. White compared the classes of 1956 through 1963, and found
that except for the class of 1959, his survey showed no significant statistical difference
between men and women at their first jobs (men were at thirty percent and women at
twenty-nine percent). Id. at 1090. However, there was a difference between men and
women at their second jobs averaging 8.6 percent. Id. at 1091 (interpretation of graph).
Considering that by this time the pay differential between men and women becomes
noticeable, see note 12 supra, this higher turnover should not be surprising.
73 
id.
74 Glancy, Women in the Law: the Dependable Ones, HARV. L.S. BULL. 28 (June 1970).
Ideally, a survey should be made over a sufficient time period so that it would indicate
whether women and men exhibit turnover differentials when such factors as return to work
after pregnancy, availability of adequate childcare facilities, and the probably relatively
greater mobility of male lawyers once they have established a reputation, are considered.
75 The Commission has determined that an employer's rule which forbids or restricts the
employment of married women and which is not applicable to married men is a dis-
crimination based on sex prohibited by title VII of the Civil Rights Act. EEOC Guide-
lines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(i) and (ii) (1970).
76Neal v. American Airlines, EEOC Dec. Case No. 6-6-5759, I CCH EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES GUIDE 6002 (June 20, 1968): "Respondent may, of course, lawfully termi-
nate a stewardess who is unable to satisfactorily perform her job because of domestic
responsibilities, or for any other reason, just as it terminates other employees who cannot
satisfactorily perform their jobs. It cannot, however, terminate her prior to individual
dereliction on her part because of its assumptions about married women as a class." See
also Colvin v. Piedmont Aviation Inc., EEOC Dec. Case No. 6-8-6975, 1 CCH EM-
PLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6003 (June 20, 1968) (to the same effect); EEOC Dec.
Case No. YSF 9-060, I CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6011 (May 21, 1969).
77308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1970). This is the only case which has dealt with and
directly decided the issue of whether marriage is a BFOQ.
In Lansdale v. International Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1970), it
was held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not allow an airline to permit a male
flight-cabin attendant to marry while not allowing female attendants the same privilege.
The court held that such discrimination could stand only if the defendant proved a BFOQ,
which issue the lower court had not considered. In Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
50 F.R.D. 213 (D. Colo. 1970), the court held that a stewardess could maintain a class
action against an airline that refused to reinstate her following her marriage.
78 In EEOC Dec. Case No. YAL 9-008, 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE
6122 (Mar. 5, 1970), a union had entered into and maintained a collective bargaining
agreement requiring automatic termination of female flight cabin attendants upon preg-
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Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 79
the court held that sex is not a BFOQ because a woman might get
pregnant. The defendant employer contended that pregnant wom-
en could not perform a particular job that occasionally involved
lifting heavy weights. However, the plaintiff was not pregnant and
while an "[e]mployer can have a rule against pregnant women
being considered for this position, Title VII surely means that all
women cannot be excluded from consideration because some of
them may become pregnant" (emphasis added).80
EEOC policy indicates that women are to be integrated into the
work force and that the employer should accommodate human
peculiarities which do not make it possible for a person to perform
the job. A person cannot be excluded from the work force be-
cause that individual may be subject to a unique physiological
occurrence characteristic of a class of which the individual is a
member, without considering the total employment character of
the person. Of course, both men and women exhibit traits peculiar
to their gender; however, what is important is the actual perform-
ance and reliability of the individual on the job. The peculiar
characteristics of women should, according to the Weeks test,
justify application of the BFOQ exception only if all or substan-
tially all women cannot efficiently perform the job involved.
Assumptions about actual family responsibilities and how par-
ticular women handle them have been declared inappropriate as
BFOQ's by the EEOC.8 ' The United States Supreme Court rec-
ognized the inappropriateness of allowing assumptions about
women as a group to be valid BFOQ exceptions in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp.8 2 However, what the courts will do once
different characteristics of men and women are proven remains to
be seen. The degree of difference between any provable male or
nancy. The Commission said that an employer may not terminate a female employee who
is compelled to cease work because of pregnancy without offering her, alternatively, a
leave of absence, except where the position is one which cannot be left vacant or filled
temporarily during the employee's anticipated absence; see also EEOC Dec. Case No. A,
68- 12- 123E (May 19, 1970); in EEOC Dec. Case No. 71-308, 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES GUIDE 6170 (Sept. 17, 1970), an employer allowed a general disability leave
of absence for twelve months without seniority interruption but did not include maternity,
and instead terminated females after the sixth month of pregnancy. The court said "[Ain
employment policy which has a foreseeable disproportionate impact upon a class protected
by title VII is unlawful unless the employer shows that the policy is so necessary to the
operation of his business as to justify the policy's discriminatory effects ...." The court
inferred from respondent's disability leave policy and its policy on maternity that respon-
dent was able to accommodate employee absences of the length typically associated with
pregnancy.
71303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
80 Id. at 759-60.
81 See notes 75-78 supra.
8291 S. Ct. 496 (1971), vacating and remanding 411 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1969).
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female characteristics necessary to justify application of the
BFOQ exception, therefore, is unknown. The Weeks test is
phrased in language that would make proof of a BFOQ exception
highly improbable. That "all or substantially all" women would be
unable to perform many tasks efficiently is unlikely. The Supreme
Court in Phillips phrased a possible BFOQ test as one which
would determine whether the existence of certain characteristics
were Z'more relevant to job performance for a woman than a
man," and thereby broadened the construction of the BFOQ to an
indeterminate degree.
In Phillips, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals'
holding that an employer's refusal to hire women with pre-school
children was nondiscriminatory, even though the employer had
hired such men.a3 The Court remanded for evidentiary consid-
erations of whether the existence of family obligations was dem-
onstrably "more relevant to job performance for a woman than a
man" and, therefore, "could arguably be a basis for distinction
under [the BFOQ exception] of the Act."' 4
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Phillips raised two
important issues regarding the Supreme Court's construction of
the BFOQ exception. First, Marshall raised the issue of just how
broadly the exception should be construed. General rules of statu-
tory construction require that a remedial statute's exceptions be
narrowly construed so that the remedial purposes of the statute
are not frustrated.a5 This rule has been applied to title VII.86 The
spectrum of construction could be characterized as going from
sanctioning clear class discrimination to a requirement that wom-
en are to be considered on an individual basis. The majority
opinion hinted at the broadest possible construction by implying
that if women differed from men in one employment character-
istic, without regard to their total employment profile, all could be
discriminated against. Marshall strongly supported the narrowest
interpretation, that the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires individual
consideration of women and that a woman could be "dis-
83 The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had devised a "sex-plus" test. If the
"plus" item used to discriminate between men and women was not some item prohibited
by title VII (items other than race, religion, or national origin), then no unlawful dis-
crimination took place. This test required that women be removed from the protection of
title VII unless they happen to be members of another minority group.
84 91 S. Ct. at 498.
85 A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945). In speaking of a claimed ex-
emption from the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court noting that the
purpose of the Act is to facilitate social progress by insuring a fair day's wage for a fair
day's work, stated "[any exemption from such humanitarian and remedial legislation must
therefore be narrowly construed, giving due regard to the plain meaning of statutory
language and the intent of Congress." Id. at 493.
" Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
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criminated" against lawfully only if she should fail to measure up
to an employer's standards of performance.
Second, Marshall raised the issue of whether the BFOQ ex-
ception should be read to justify a difference in treatment if
women could not compare favorably with men in an examination
of every single job performance standard, although women could
meet the minimum performance standards and compare favorably
with men on the whole:
I cannot agree with the Court's indication that a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of Martin Marietta's business could be established
by a showing that some women, even the vast majority, with
preschool age children have family responsibilities that in-
terfere with job performance and that men do not usually
have such responsibilities. Certainly, an employer can require
that all of his employees, both men and women, meet min-
imum performance standards .... Congress intended to pre-
vent employers from refusing to hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes .... Even charac-
terization of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not
to serve as predicates for restricting employment opportun-
ity .... The exception for 'bona fide occupational quali-
fication' was not intended to swallow the rule.
87
Marshall objected to the majority's failure to acknowledge a nar-
row BFOQ test, whether of the Weeks variety or the individual
consideration proposed by Marshall, and to the Court's hinting at
permitting a BFOQ because of a peculiar adverse trait which
women might demonstrate more on the average than men, but
which has nothing to do with an individual's overall performance.
It would seem to be more advantageous to both the employee and
the employer to measure employee desirability on the basis of
individual performance rather ,than on class averages. There is
bound to be one trait which will affect the performance of one
group more than another, men or women, whites or blacks, Gen-
tile or Jew. From the Court's implication, perhaps the fact that
men have more heart attacks than women, "if demonstrably more
relevant to job performance" for men than women, should justify
the refusal of an employer to hire men.
The Supreme Court seems to have intimated an attitude con-
trary to reason and the current weight of judicial thought about
the BFOQ. In many recent weight-lifting cases the courts have
required that each person be judged on individual merit and that if
87 91 S. Ct. 496.498 (1971).
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employers were to retain the weight-lifting limitations at all, they
were to be applied equally to both sexes. 88 Applying this judicial
trend to cases involving assumptions about, or even statistical
evidence of, the correlations between family responsibility and job
reliability" would require employers to do just as Marshall sug-
gests- require both men and women employees to meet minimum
standards of job responsibility and to let each individual be judged
on her success or failure to do so, rather than to assume that
women cannot meet minimum standards.
The Supreme Court did recognize that assumptions about the
employment characteristics of women could not qualify as a
BFOQ exception. However, the Court's implied broadening of
the BFOQ exception has threatened the survival of the rule
against sex discrimination in employment and was accomplished
in a per curiam decision so vague as to leave the lower courts with
no guidance. The Supreme Court noted that it was not determin-
ing whether a BFOQ existed under the facts and remanded for
evidentiary consideration of that issue. However, the Court did
gratuitously suggest a test for the BFOQ, that "existence of
conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to
job performance for a woman than for a man, could arguably be a
basis" 9 0 for application of the BFOQ. Although the Supreme
Court technically was not announcing a rule of law, the mere fact
that it suggested such a BFOQ standard when other standards at
least- arguably exist and did so in such a vague and summary
context suggests that the decision could be interpreted as an
indication of the tenor of any future decision should the issue
actually come up before the Supreme Court.
18 These limitations based on state protective legislation have been held to be illegally
discriminatory because the limitations do not constitute BFOQ's, the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution overriding the conflicting state law. See EEOC Guide-
lines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b)(l) and (2) (1970), followed in EEOC Decisions to hold such
state protective legislation discrimination in violation of title VII. See EEOC Dec. Case
No. YIA 9-045, 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6115 (Jan. 21, 1970); EEOC
Dec. Case No. YAT 9-045, 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6116 (Jan. 19,
1970); EEOC Dec. Case No. YCL 9-144, 1 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE
6117 (Jan. 19, 1970); MICH. ATT'Y GEN. Op., No. 4687 (Dec. 30, 1969); OKLA. ATT'Y
GEN. Op., No. 69-304 (Dec. 5, 1969); WASH. ATT'Y GEN. Op., No. 69-304 (Dec. 5,
1969). See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Richards v.
Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co.,
293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker, I CCH
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 8061 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, 1970).
89 Such statistics may reflect more than the present effects of discriminatory social
attitudes than any disabilities of women. Present cultural expectations concerning family
responsibility may require that the woman attend to childcare, therefore requiring her
absence from her job and inhibiting the formation of adequate alternative childcare facil-
ities. To use the number of days away from the job because of family responsibilities,
without considering the total employment profile, would allow present discriminatory
attitudes to perpetuate themselves under sanction of law.
9091 S. Ct. 496, 498 (1971).
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If such a broad BFOQ were to be adopted as implied by the
Supreme Court, its application would require great clarification.
The lower courts would have to decide how much more relevant
certain characteristics of one sex must be to job performance in
order to apply the BFOQ; courts would have to decide whether
employers would be permitted to hire no women or fewer other-
wise qualified women if such a BFOQ were accepted; and courts
would have to decide whether employers must hire on individual
merit when testing is possible, despite the existence of a BFOQ
pertaining to a class.
A reasonable construction of the BFOQ exception to title
VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in employment might pro-
vide:
An employer may legally establish minimum job performance
standards, reasonably related to the employer's legitimate
business objectives, 9' which standards are not used with the
intent to result or the effect of resulting in sex discrimination.
A BFOQ exception should be allowed if it can be demonstra-
ted that either sex, having the same minimum skills or ex-
perience as the other, fails to meet minimum performance
standards of the job in question so much more frequently than
the other sex that the employer's business would noticeably
suffer from further employment of such less adequate per-
sons. This test would apply only if there were no means of
testing or reasonably estimating individual performance or no
way for the individual to demonstrate that (s)he can meet the
minimum standards.
A test of this nature for the BFOQ exception should be reason-
able because it would permit employers to maintain legitimate
overall job performance standards and legally to discriminate
against women (or men) when further employment of that group is
noticeably uneconomic, and yet it would preserve title VII's pur-
pose of affording women the opportunity to pursue the goal of
economic sustenance without unreasonable impediment.
IV. THE ADVISABILITY OF SUIT
A resort to complaint proceedings before the EEOC, and possi-
bly litigation,92 may in certain circumstances be advantageous to
91 An example of a job performance standard not reasonably related to the employer's
legitimate business objectives would be a corporation's requiring executive trainees to lift
and carry a sixty pound weight fifty yards and not requiring or expecting executives to do
so as part of their job. An otherwise qualified ninety-five pound woman might have
difficulty meeting such a job performance standard.
92 The law requires that a complaining party first seek relief under state or local law, if
there is any proscription of the particular type of discrimination complained of. 42 U.S.C.
SPRI NG 1971 ]
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women professionals, executives or administrators. The courts
can order an employer to give the woman employee back pay
which she was denied because of unlawful, discriminatory meth-
ods of compensation.93 For a woman who has been denied equal
opportunity in gaining a job, the commission can try to persuade,
or the court can order, the employer to reconsider the applicant
for the job on a nondiscriminatory basis and/or give back pay
from the date of illegal rejection. 9 4 Also, the applicant and em-
ployee could get injunctive relief requiring an employer to consid-
er them for areas of legal practice in which they are interested. 95
Title VII conditions injunctive relief on showing that the de-
fendant has "intentionally engaged ... in an unlawful employment
practice."9 6 Considering the difficulties involved in proving a state
§ 2000e-5(c) (1964). After expiration of sixty days from the time the individual com-
mences proceedings under the local or state law, the EEOC considers the charges to have
been filed with the Commission and begins processing the case. Id. § 2000e-5(c). If there
is no applicable state or local law prohibiting the practices complained of, the complainant
must file the charge with the EEOC within ninety days after the alleged unlawful conduct
occurred, id. § 2000e-5(d). If the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge made is true, after investigation, it tries to remedy the situation by
informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. Id. § 2000e-5(a). A com-
plainant may file suit under title VII in a federal district court within thirty days of receipt
of notification from the Commission that it has been unable to obtain voluntary com-
pliance. Id. § 2000e-5(e). A Commission finding of reasonable cause is not necessary for
federal jurisdiction. Flowers v. Laborers Local 6, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970); Fekete v.
United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3 d Cir. 1970); Grimm v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 300 F.Supp 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
93 If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employ-
ment practice, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
practice and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, including reinstatement
or hiring of employees, with or without back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964). The
Justice Department plans to continue seeking monetary relief, apart from any back wages,
andconjectured that "such relief will soon be granted." 74 LAB. REL. REP. 375 (Aug. 24,
1970).94Title VII makes provision for awarding of reasonable attorney's fees, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (1964), and empowers the court to appoint an attorney for the complaining
party. Id. § 2000e-5(e). See Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969),
where the court granted an injunction ordering the defendant to desist from its unlawfully
discriminatory practices. The court declined to grant back pay to applicants illegally
rejected because they had applied for jobs merely to test defendant's hiring policies. This
strike suit should be noted for its implications for use as leverage to encourage employers
to change discriminatory hiring policies. Relief for an applicant could be a demand to
consider her for employment on the same basis as other applicants and an order to hire.
See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. 11. 1970) (stewardess ordered
rehired after she was fired because of marriage). Relief for a female lawyer employee could
consist of an order for back pay lost as a result of discrimination, possibly at the rate of
pay for such jobs as she would have requested and qualified for if a nondiscriminatory
promotion policy had been in existence. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Corp., 416 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1969).
95 In Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969), the court did
not allow the employer to fill "helper" jobs, previously open only to whites, until all blacks
presently employed were given the opportunity, on the basis of the employer's promotion
rules, to bid for and transfer to those jobs. In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F.
Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), the court ordered the employer to consider, without regard
to sex, the plaintiff for any position sought by her.
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(g) (1964).
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of mind, if a plaintiff could get a remedy only when an employer
willfully intended to discriminate, but not when an employer vol-
untarily did those acts 'which effected the discrimination, title VII
would provide little protection. Moreover, a requirement of spec-
ific intent is not sensible where employer liability results only in
correcting an inequitable situation and not in criminal penalties.
With the exception of one case, 9 7 it has been uniformly held that
"intent" to discriminate for the purposes of title VII, means to
have knowingly and voluntarily done those acts which resulted in
discrimination, and not necessarily to have acted with the intent
to discriminate.
An injunctive remedy under title VII not only may correct past
abuses, but may prohibit future violations.9 8 Thus, it is possible to
obtain injunctive relief which would require the employer to de-
sign, or the court may design, a completely new hiring policy
where the present employment policy is inherently discriminatory.
The Justice Department has announced that the kind of relief it
will seek in pattern and practice cases99 will be designed to
"eliminate the structural impediments to equal employment op-
portunities, and the practices which perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination.- 100 The federal courts increasingly act upon the
principle that they possess full powers to eliminate the present
effects of past discrimination. 10 1
97 Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969) has interpreted
the word "intentionally" to mean "willful and knowingly." Id. at 341. However, in all
other cases it has been held that it is not necessary to intend specifically to discriminate,
but only to have committed knowingly and voluntarily those acts resulting in dis-
crimination; Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969);
Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969); Dobbins v. I.B.E.W.
Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
98 Dobbins v. I.B.E.W. Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968) held that an
appropriate remedial order must accomplish three objectives in addition to prohibiting
future violations: (I) deprive the defendant of gains made from the wrongful conduct; (2)
eliminate effects of past unlawful practices; and (3) close off "untravelled roads" to the
illicit end.
9 "Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of
any of the rights secured by this title ... the Attorney General may bring a civil ac-
tion ... requesting such relief. . . as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the
rights herein described .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964).
10074 LAB. REL. REP. 371, 374 (August 24, 1970).
105 Examples of these broad decrees are: the second decree in United States v. Paperma-
kers Local 189, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1969), which commanded extensive revamping
of an entire seniority system and contractual practices in order to promote advancement
for all black employees plant-wide; Volger v. McCarty, Inc., 2 F.E.P. 491 (E.D. La.
1970), where the court extended an earlier order to provide for complete overhaul of a
craft union's referral system; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969) where the court ordered a modification of union local referral systems,
experience requirements for blacks otherwise qualified, and the journeyman's examination
so that it could be given and graded in such a manner as to permit review. Although these
cases involve racial discrimination in industrial plants, the principles announced are appli-
cable to hiring, promotion and pay policies. It could mean that an employer of lawyers
would be required to use reviewable standards in hiring, promotion, and pay policies.
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Among disadvantages in resorting to such procedures against a
present or potential employer would be a deterioration of working
relationships leading to loss of job effectiveness or accom-
plishment and unpleasant working conditions. 10 2 For the woman
who is already suffering such conditions, however, suit might not
appreciably aggravate the situation. Nevertheless, in some in-
stances a more attractive alternative than actually starting legal
proceedings may simply be to communicate to the employer a
knowledge of one's legal rights and the willingness, if necessary,
to resort to legal proceedings. Such communication may itself
provide powerful leverage in negotiating for fair employment
practices in hiring or on the job, for the annoyance and possible
public embarrassment that legal proceedings under title VII in-
volve may provide an incentive to behave fairly.' 03
Lawyer-employers are especially familiar with the possible nui-
sance involved in being investigated by a government agency or
being sued. Title VII gives the EEOC, in aid of its investigatory
powers,10 4 the power to demand any relevant evidence of any
person being investigated in regard to an unlawful employment
practice 10 5 and the power to enforce that demand by court order if
necessary. 10 6 The courts have broadly construed the power of the
EEOC to demand evidence. For example, in one case a court held
that an EEOC request for information regarding all
non-supervisory personnel at a plant where the alleged dis-
102 Congress recognized this threat when enacting title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(1964) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee or applicant
because he opposed any unlawful employment practice or took part in any investigation,
proceeding or hearing under title VII.
103 See note 92 supra. Another method for attempting to provide incentives to employers
to utilize fair employment practices would be for women to insure the passage or enforce-
ment of binding policies upon their law school placement offices. A policy statement
sponsored by the New York City Bar Association and signed by nineteen law schools
reads as follows: "Each signatory law school is committed to a policy against dis-
crimination based on sex .... It is expected that employers will conform to this policy,
expressed in law by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and take positive steps to
assure that no such discrimination occurs in hiring, promotion, compensation or work
assignment. Any complaints will be investigated, as the placement facilities of each
signatory school are available only to employers whose practices are consistent with this
policy." Under this statement of policy, the University of Michigan Law School banned a
Wall Street firm from the use of law school placement facilities as of April 1970.
104 "In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under section 2000e- 5 ... the
Commission or its designated representative shall at all reasonable times have access
to ... and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded
against ... and is relevant to the charge under investigation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)
(1964).
105 "For the purposes of any investigation of a charge filed under the authority contained
in section 2000e-5 of this title, the Commission shall have authority ... to require the
production of documentary evidence relevant or material to the charge under in-
vestigation .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(a) (1964).
106 Id. § 2000e-9(b).
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crimination took place and which was limited to a five year period
was not overly-broad.
10 7
Should a complaint go as far as court proceedings, the employ-
er may be significantly embarrassed by having the relevance and
propriety of his personnel information and hiring procedures dis-
cussed in court. Information which the EEOC may demand in-
cludes pay scales and their method of computation, 0 8 quali-
fications of all applicants and present employees, 0 9 and employee
job performance ratings and promotion procedures." 0
Whether or not an individual plaintiff should win her case, her
action may motivate the particular employer, and with adequate
publicity, the profession in general, to examine attitudes and pol-
icies toward women lawyers. Despite the difficulties female pro-
fessionals, executives or administrators would face in proving a
case of discrimination, women should consider the possible ben-
eficial effects of legal proceedings upon their occupational peers
when considering various methods of improving their status with-
in their profession and within society at large.
V. CONCLUSION
The past record of equal employment opportunity for women
lawyers is bleak. In the past decade, however, significant statu-
tory reform has taken place. Hopefully, the knowledge and under-,
standing of employment rights by both women and employers will
encourage fair practices. Hopefully, the legal profession, having a
special responsibility with respect to the law, will examine its own
attitudes and policies so that it may begin to erase sex dis-
crimination from the profession. An opportunity for women to
attempt to overcome sex discrimination in employment now ex-
ists.
-Giovanna M. Longo*
107 Georgia Power& Light Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969).
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